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Stephen B. Pressert

It was the practice of my first-year civil procedure professor,
a sagacious, salty and spellbinding man, to begin each introduction to a new topic of law with a description of its common-law
antecedents. One day we began studying new trials, and he
started to tell us about attaint. Before the sixteenth century, the
professor explained, if a special attaint jury found that another

jury had decided a case wrongly, according to the common law
those first jurors would lose their freedom, would become
forever infamous, and would thereupon forfeit their goods and
the profits of their lands; their houses would be razed, their
meadows plowed, and their trees pulled up by the roots; they
would be imprisoned forever, and their wives and children
would be put out of doors.'
Struck by this and the other tales of the common law related
by this professor, I began to wonder what could have led any
society to adopt such a system, and what it must have been like to
live under it. I was thus introduced to what has been called the
"romance" of legal history.2 I soon discovered that many authors
had chronicled the pageantry and the development of the law of
t A.B. 1968, J.D. 1971, Harvard University. Member, Massachusetts and District of
Columbia Bars. The reviewer wishes to thank his colleagues, Daniel D. Polsby and Paul
D. Gewirtz, who were most helpful in criticizing an earlier draft.
'Lecture delivered by Professor James H. Chadbourne, March 21, 1969, as
reconstructed from the reviewer's notes.
2
The desire to study legal history is far from universal among students or even
among professors of the law. Particularly in a period such as ours, when there has been a
concerted effort to discard the "archaic paraphernalia" of the law of the past, it is
frequently asked what sense it makes to study the development of old law. Several
answers to this question are possible: (1) the study of legal history is essential to an
understanding of jurisprudence-that is, without a knowledge of what the law has been, it
is impossible to reach any understanding of the development of the philosophy of law;
(2) the study of legal history leads to a coherent conception of the entire body of law,
rather than the piecemeal approach so often found in law schools; (3) the study of legal
history teaches the student that the law is constantly in flux, and helps him to predict the
new courses that it may take in light of social developments; (4) the romance of legal
history is exciting in itself. See generallyMurphy, Book Review, 1 Am.J. LEGALHIST. 259,
263 (1957) & sources cited.
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England,3 but that no one had yet tried to set out what I hoped
was the equally romantic panorama of American legal history. 4
Professor Friedman has now written that story.
As Professor Friedman observes, any history of American
law is to some extent a history of American life, s and his history
is therefore wide in scope. There is much familiar Americana in
A History ofA merican Law of the type out of which poems, novels
and even television series have been made. There
is information8
7
on the Salem witch trials, 6 county poorhouses, squatters' rights,
foreclosure on farmers' mortgages, 9 the legendary oratory of
Daniel Webster 10 vigilantes," hanging judges, 12 blue laws,1 3 "no
fishing" signs, railroad bells,15 sharecroppers,16 chain gangs 17
and much more. In addition to these better-known items of
American folklore, there are occasionally references to the most
obscure esoterica such as the "lost" states of Franklin, the Indian
Stream Republic and the State of Deseret1 8 There are also
historical tidbits of particular interest to lawyers, such as the
explanation of how Reno became a divorce mill, 9 and the
revelation thatJustice Cardozo's father, a New York judge at the
time of the Boss Tweed ring, was thought to be as corrupt as his
son was wise. 20 There is also a description of NewJersey's role at
the turn of the century as the "Mother of Trusts," and of how
Delaware became a corporate haven. 21 Finally, and proving the
hoary cliche that every lawyer must to some extent be a legal
3

See, e.g., T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th ed. 1956);
F. POLLOCK &F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898).
4

0n the perceived need for a history of American law, see generally Hamlin, A
History of American Law: Possibilities, Progress and Resources and Initial Requirements, 2
N.Y.L.F. 76 (1956).
5

L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 595 (1973)
FRIEDMAN].
6

1d 62.
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Id 189-91.
1d 205.
9
Id 374-75.
8

'ld

274.

1

1d319-22.
121d 327-28.
131d511-12.
141d 366 (semble).
'-'Id 419.
161d 373-74.
171d 523-24.
' 81d 102.
'9 1d 439.
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1d 325-26.
21

1d 458.
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historian, Professor Friedman has woven into his historical
narrative virtually every precedential old chestnut still taught in
law school.22
The aim of the book is an ambitious one; it is "the first
attempt to do anything remotely like a general history, a survey
of the development of American law, including some treatment
of substance, procedure, and legal institutions.' 23 The two
developments which make such a history possible at this time,
according to the author, are the recent work of important
scholars such as Willard Hurst,24 and the evolution of modern
social science. Social science, explains Professor Friedman, has
been "eagerly, even passionately grasped" in his analysis, in this
effort to25 demonstrate that American law is a "mirror of
society."
The mirror is illuminated by dividing American legal
history into four periods, the first three of which are dealt with in
some detail, while the last is relegated to a thirty-page coda.
These are respectively The Beginnings: American Law in the
ColonialPeriod;From the Revolution to the Death of ChancellorKent7776-1847; American Law to the Close of the 19th Century; and the
epilogue, American Law in the 20th Century. Parts II and III taken
together account for eighty percent of the book, which is
principally concerned with the nineteenth century, the period
that has been called the "Golden Age" or the "Formative Era" of
American law. 26 The composition of the parts varies, but in
general for each time period there is a discussion of the structure
of government and particular political problems, law and the
economy, commercial law, property law, criminal law, torts, the
bench and bar, and legal literature.
A History ofAmerican Law arrives at a propitious time, when
there may at last be a widespread awareness of the need for an
increased emphasis on legal history in the curriculum of the
American law scho6l 27 and when a flowering of American legal

22
See, e.g., the discussions of Marbury v. Madison, id 117; Trustees ofDartmouth College v.
Woodward, id 174-75; Wheaton v. Peters, id 226; Gibbons v. Ogden, id 230-31; Swift v.
Tyson, id 231; Plessy v. Ferguson, id 443; and even such old English gems as Hadley v.
Baxendale, id 467; and M'Naghten's Case, id 514.
23
Id 9.
24
1d 10. See, eg., J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS

(1950).
2-FRIEDMAN 10.
26
THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW
FORMATIVE ERA OFAMERICAN LAW (1938).
27

(C. Haar ed. 1965); R.

POUND, THE

For recent observations on the need for such an historical perspective in American
legal education see, eg., D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 444
(1965); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law Schoo4 in LAW IN AMERICAN
HISToRY403, 406 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
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historical scholarship may be taking place. 28 The stage thus being
set, it is appropriate at the appearance of this self-proclaimed
first general history of American law to take a broad look at the
current concepts of American legal history in general, and in
particular as they are set forth by Professor Friedman. To a
certain modest extent, then, the aim of this Review is not only to
evaluate Professor Friedman's book, but also to determine what
paths of inquiry are now being taken by American legal history,
and what other avenues might profitably be pursued.
No doubt sensing the timeliness and importance of his
endeavor, Professor Friedman has made A History of American
Law a study and a statement of legal historiography as well as
legal history. Several themes, or interpretations of the historical
facts, weave in and out of the narrative, and the subject of the
book is not only what American law has been, but also the forces
that have shaped it and the functions it has fulfilled. These are
the themes that have determined past and present thinking
among legal historians, and the book's exposition of them makes
it a valuable introduction to the discipline.
Broadly speaking, these themes fall into three categories:
those which describe the substance of American law, those which
29
describe its form or structureand those which describe its functionY
Perhaps a brief examination of some of these themes and of the
areas of the development of law to which they relate is the best
approach to understanding and evaluating Professor Friedman's
view of American legal history. Such an examination demonstrates that while the themes perceived by Professor Friedman
are not original, and some have their roots in late nineteenth
century legal scholarship, Professor Friedman's use of them has
led him to an exposition of the development of American law
that is orderly and coherent, and uniquely that of the social
scientist.
28

See, e.g., G. DUNNE, JUSTICEJOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1970); R. ELLIS, THEJEFFERSONIAN CRISIS (1971); C. FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1888
PART 1 (1971); J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (197 1); LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supranote

27.

29
This type-specification of the book's themes is not to be found in the book itself.
Indeed, one of the problems with the book is that relatively little effort is made to
consider its themes together, or to weigh the relative importance of the individual
themes. Other than in the introduction to each part (which attempts to set an atmosphere
or motif for each time period) themal discussion is irregular and mixed into the treatment
of the substantive areas of law. As it is helpful both in the understanding of American
legal history as a whole, and in judging to what extent Professor Friedman has succeeded
in his aim to write a comprehensive treatment of the subject, the reviewer hopes that he
may have license to integrate and extrapolate somewhat from the themes as they are set
forth in the book.
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Professor Friedman's conception of the substance of law is
basically the same as that set forth by Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. in 1881.30 As Professor Friedman puts it: "The basic premise
of this book is that, despite a strong dash of history and
idiosyncrasy, the strongest ingredient in American law, at any
given time, is the present: current emotions, real economic
interests, concrete political groups."' To the same effect are
statements such as, "The theory of legal history is that the
32
architect of contemporary law is always contemporary fact,",
and "Sentiment and tradition had little place in commercial law;
only the fittest and most functional survived., 33 That Professor
Friedman's perspective is that of the sociologist studying social
change is confirmed by a necessary corollary to the substantive
theme just noted. Thus, with regard to legal change, it is stated
that "the theory of this book is that law moves with its times and
is eternally new," 34 and "[h]istory of law is not-or should not
be-a search for fossils, but a study of social development,
unfolding through time." 35 The statement of this theme warns
the reader that because Professor Friedman will be concentrating
on social development, and views law as eternally new, there will
be relatively little in the narrative about universals and constants
in American law, and law will be viewed as reflecting
developments in other spheres of American life, principally
economics and, to some extent, politics.
As is the case with other social science disciplines, the
themes in legal history that deal with the law's form and
structure have been derived by both inductive and deductive
routes. What Professor Friedman calls "the master trend of
American Legal History; the trend to create one legal culture
out of many; to reduce legal pluralism; to broaden the base of
the formal, official system of law; to increase the proportion of
persons . . .who are consumers or objects of that law,' 36 is a

valuable insight that has been gained through empirical study of
legal developments. The parts of the book that deal with this
inductive theme, which the author has also called "the pushing
30

The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it
goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and
machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results,
depend very much upon its past.
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
31
FRIEDMAN 14.
32
1d 178.
3Id 247.
34Id 14.
35ld 15.
6Id 572.
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and pulling of [centrifugal and centripetal] forces: uniformity
and diversity in constant tension over time" 37 are perhaps the
richest and most revealing, in that they illustrate the feisty,
peculiarly American development of a legal system through the
machinations of antagonistic groups and individuals. 38 Under
this rubric are to be found the descriptions of the struggle
between those who championed the cause of a civil-law type
codification for America, such as David Dudley Field, and those
who thought that adherence to the inherited
English common39
law system of jurisprudence was wiser.
Also within this "uniformity and diversity" theme is
Friedman's analysis of the building of what he felicitously calls
"the republic of bees." This was the process whereby the framers
of law in the different states borrowed from each other and from
the mother country, alighting on the different and varying
flowers of new and old social and economic institutions, taking
the nectar, and making out of it a honey of their own-"a
distinctive system: a separate language of law within the family
founded in England." 4 Included in this process were the key
problems of the adoption of the common law of England and
English statutes, 4 1 and the question of the existence of a federal
common law of crimes. 42 Another element of the process was a
recurring radical strain of American law that seeks to "abolish
the tyranny of rules, to reduce law to the level of the common
man."3 so that it will serve the millions, and not just a privileged
few.
A deductive theme regarding the structure of American law
expounded by Professor Friedman has been derived from
sociological theory. It is the tendency of laws or legal institutions
37

1d 31.

Both colonial law and the law of the United States were subject to
centrifugal and centripetal forces: forces that pulled jurisdictions apart;
forces that pushed them together. The mother country, its agents, its
superior legal culture-these acted centripetally, before Independence;
economic unity, guaranteed by the federal system, was a strong centripetal
force after Independence. Geographical isolation, local politics, and the
sovereignty, in law and fact, of different pieces of the country, provided an
enormous amount of centrifugal legal force.
38
For a good introduction to some of the peculiarities of the American national
character, such as 19th-century rugged individualism, which peculiarities led to some of
the legal developments discussed by Friedman, see Potter, The Quest for the National
Character,in THE RECONSTRUCTION OFAMERICAN HISTORY 197 (J. Higham ed. 1963).
39
FRIEDMAN 340-46,351-55.
40
1d 98.
41
d 96-98.
42

d 254-55.

43

Id 98-99.
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to move "from the simple to the more complex, from the
undifferentiated to the hierarchical.", 44 In connection with this
theme Professor Friedman describes how the law of divorce and
the chartering of corporations evolved from the simple expedient of ad hoc treatment by the legislature to the construction of a
more sophisticated statutory system intended to handle all
cases. 45 He also alludes to how economic demands resulted in the
"patchwork of power" distribution of legal authority among the
federal, state and local governments.46
Perhaps the most provocative of the themes of American legal
history and certainly the most important to Professor Friedman
are those that deal with the function of American law. The motif
of this type that is the most pervasive in A History of American
Law is the conception of law, and particularly common law, as an
instrument consciously employed to forge or abet social
change,47 rather than as a static body of "natural law" principles
which are "uncovered," or "found," but not made by judges. It
is disappointing that Professor Friedman fails to deal fully with
the changes in political theory that probably led to the
emergence of the instrumental conception of law in America.
Instead he appears to view this development principally as a
matter of economics.4 9 Still, the exposition of this theme in the
book leads to some of the most lucid analysis of important
44Id 40. This is the structural-functional analysis of the modem sociologist a it is set
forth in current theories of "rationalism" and "structural differentiation." See, eg., M.
WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (A. Henderson & T.
Parsons transl. 1947); N. SMELSER, SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

(1959).
45

FRIEDMAN 166-69, 181-83. Not noted by Professor Friedman is a parallel
development in the history of American adoption law. See Presser, The Historical
BackgroundoftheAmericanLawofAdoption, 11 J. FAMILYL. 443,461-70 (1971).
46FRIEDMAN 568-73.
47
The term "instrumental" as it is used in the remainder of this Review to apply to
Professor Friedman's conception of law implies this view that law is an instrument for
social change. In a sense, of course, all concepts of law are "instrumental" in that all see law
as acting on or controlling men, even those which see the law itself as relatively static and
an agent for the preservation of the status quo. Where Professor Friedman has used the
term, it has principally been in the more limited sense that it is used here. Some
ambiguity does surround Professor Friedman's use of the words "instrument" or
"instrumental" as they apply to law, however, and the book would have benefited from a
clearer definition of these terms.
48FRIEDMAN 19, 99-100. Another aspect of this theme is the struggle that Friedman
notes between what he calls the "jurisprudence cf concept," or the dry legal logic of men
like Christopher Columbus Langdell and Samuel Williston, and what Friedman clearly
regards as the richer, more enlightened "legal realist" view of a law tempered with
experience, as expounded by Karl LlewellynJerome Frank and Arthur Corbin. Id 593.
49
Compare id 99-100 with Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of
AmericanLaw, 1780-1820,in LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 27, at 287. Professor
Horwitz argues persuasively that 18th century notions of popular sovereignty led to the
disintegration of the natural law foundations of common law rules and the concomitant
emergence of an instrumental conception of law.
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developments in American law. One such example is the use of
criminal law as more than an expression of current standards 50
of
morality, as a vehicle for economic and social planning.
Another is the allocation of the costs of industrial accidents,
under nineteenth century tort law, among the members of
society as a whole, and away from the more productive industrial
sector.51 A final example, and this in a more legislative context, is
the administrative regulation of business by state and local
legislatures and special agencies during the period supposedly
characterized by laissez-fairebut actually a time of government
intervention
to foster and protect certain favored sectors of the
52
economy.
In addition, the notion of law as an instrument for social
change has enabled Professor Friedman, drawing directly from
the work of Willard Hurst,5 3 to present a coherent view of
nineteenth-century Americah law that reveals much of the
special character of the period, and which complements the work
of more general American historians such as Turner, 55 H. H.
Bancroft- and Beard.57 In this view, between about the time of
the Revolution and 1850 "[t]he theme of American law . . . was
the release of energy," 58 as legal institutions attempted to foster
wide-ranging economic development, but by 1900 the theme
was: "hold the line."5 9 During this latter period, "[t]he notion
was: organize or die .... -60 American law was then shaped by
the formation of special interest groups such as labor unions,
industrial combines and farmers' organizations, and law began to
be used more to forestall encroachments upon established
interests. From the Civil War to the end of the century was the
period when "robber barons" grew fat, and the period when
50

FRIEDMAN 64.

51

Id 414.
kd 384-400.

52
53

j. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

UNITED
5 4 STATES (1956).

Though the narrative does provide this coherent broad overview of nineteenthcentury law, sorely missing is any detailed architectonic conception of the way the

individual topics of substantive law relate to each other. The book would have benefited
from a preface setting forth Friedman's perspective in more detail. A good example is the
orderly conception presented inJ. HURST, supranote 24, at 3-19.
55

296, 322; see F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1920).
FRIEDMAN 322. Professor Friedman refers to H. BANCROFT, POPULAR TRIBUNALS
(1887). See also H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC STATES OF NORTH AMERICA
56 FRIEDMAN

(1882-90).
57
Professor Friedman's (and Willard Hurst's) great debt to the class-conflict
economic interpretations of Charles A. Beard is obvious. Compare, e.g., C. BEARD, AN
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1913) with
FRIEDMAN
484-87.
58
FRIEDMAN

59

60 1d

Id 322.

296.
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"judicial review reached its most bizarre excesses''61as conserva-

doctrines of due process in the
tive judges enlisted constitutional
62
service of economic reaction.
Professor Friedman's treatment of these themes, and
particularly the notion of law as an instrument for social change,
points up the essentially economic interpretation of American
legal history which dominates his book.63 Occasionally the
analysis borders on the purely Marxian. Thus Professor
Friedman sees some of the aspects of the history of American law
in the latter part of the nineteenth century as a class struggle
between the middle-class professionals-especially judges who
overturned legislation designed to protect the proletariat-and
the newly class-conscious urban worker. Both groups are
pictured as scrambling for a share in what both sides perceived as
the zero-sum game of the economy. 64 Although it is not always
clear from the narrative in A History ofA mericanLaw, or the work
of other American legal historians such as Willard Hurst,
perspectives on American legal history other than the economic
or the political are possible, and perhaps the most significant
not develop
failing of Professor Friedman's book is that he 6does
5
these other perspectives to a satisfactory extent.
One question that remains after reading A History of
American Law is the weight that Professor Friedman attaches, or
the weight that should be attached generally, to biography, to the
definition of the position and significance of particular men in
American legal history. Individual lives clearly are of some
importance to Professor Friedman, as illustrated by the fact that
some of his best and most absorbing writing is the description of
particular personages, such as the judicial figures Marshall,66
Story6 7 and Kent. Further, Professor Friedman expounds a
commonly-held view that the importance of individual judges
61
62

1d 298.

1d 300.
As Professor Friedman says with regard to usury laws, "[bly and large it was
economic
interest, not ideology, that called the tune." Id 475.
64
63

65

1d 399.

Professor Friedman does comment occasionally on the impact of morals on the
law, for instance at id 435, where he states: "In the law of marriage and divorce, religion,
sentiment, and morals influenced the law, along with economic and business motives."
The reader is left wondering precisely what weight Professor Friedman would attach
morality.
overall
66 to the continuing nexus between law and
1d 117-18.
67
1d 288-90.
68
1d 118-19, 290-92. Indeed, the last must be of particular significance to Professor
Friedman, as he picks the death of James Kent to signal the end of one of the eras he
describes. See text accompanying note 26 supra. Curiously, he never explains why this
date was selected as marking the close of the period rather than, for example, the date of
the Civil War, which Roscoe Pound said closed the formative era of American law. R.
POUND, supranote 26, at 3.
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was markedly decreased after the Civil War.6 9 Yet, as Professor
Friedman himself acknowledges, the country's benches were not
totally without great men during the period, men like Thomas
Cooley, Charles Doe and Oliver Wendell Holmes,Jr. 70 And
during that time individuals who were not judges, such as David
Dudley Field and Christopher Columbus Langdell, were clearly
having a profound impact on American law. Though Professor
Friedman is sensitive to the importance of great men in legal
history, he leaves no definite impression of how their personalities compare in impact with the economic forces which
dominate the book. This is a relatively minor flaw in the
coherent conception of nineteenth-century American legal
history that he has set forth, but one hopes that at some future
time a legal historian will further elaborate the importance of
biography to the understanding of American legal history.
Another question that the book raises by inference, but does
not answer, is the ultimate and continuing importance to
American legal history of jurisprudential theories, in particular
the natural law theory that, to a greater or lesser extent, law
exists apart from the men who interpret or are governed by it,
and is ultimately made up of certain immutable principles of
common right and reason. 1Professor Friedman does mention in
a footnote that "[a] kind of natural-law aura hovered about the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, even in the late 19th century;
this was important but exceptional."" However, he never makes
a judgment about the continuing importance of natural law
theory to American legal history. Since natural law theory
presupposes to some degree a notion that law is found or
discovered and not made, and since this notion is antithetical to
the instrumental conception of law to which Professor Friedman
appears to subscribe, it is perhaps not surprising that natural law
has received short shrift in his narrative. Yet the omission seems
unfortunate, because not only did a natural law aura hover about
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Declaration of
Independence fairly reeks of it. Also, as Professor Friedman
notes, ideas of natural law influenced the adoption of the
common law in America,7 3 the acceptance of a civil law code in
Louisiana, 74 and the cast of mind among prominent late
69

FRIEDMAN 331-33.

70

d

71

Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610), is often regarded as the
quintessence of the natural law point of view. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 100
rev.7 ed.
1969).
2
FRIEDMAN 385 n.2.
1Jd 95.

73

74

1d 153-54.
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nineteenth-century legal educators.7 5 Even today ideas of natural
law play a major role in jurisprudential thought in this country.7 6
Given this rather pervasive presence of natural law concepts, it is
difficult to believe that they did not have some influence among
lawyers and judges," and to some extent shape American law.
This would seem to have occurred in the recent past when Chief
Justice Earl Warren habitually
disarmed advocates with the
' 78
insistent query "Is it fair?
Thus, some additional insight might be gained from a
perspective on American legal history focused more narrowly on
jurisprudential notions such as natural law, instead of Professor
Friedman's treatment which concentrates principally on economics. However, Professor Friedman is clearly aware that
jurisprudential notions played some part in the growth of
American law, and he alludes to the force of the nineteenthcentury historical school of jurisprudence (which owed much to
natural law theories) 79 onjames Carter, who led the fight against
codification in the late part of the century. 80 Apart from a very
few acknowledgments such as this, however, the impact of
jurisprudence or legal philosophy on American law does not
seem to be accorded much weight by Professor Friedman. In this
connection, it is interesting to note that noneconomic approaches
were suggested two generations ago when Roscoe Pound noted
at least four possible interpretations of legal history based on
jurisprudence.82
One of Professor Friedman's aims in writing this first
general survey was to attempt to provide American legal history
with a measure of conventional wisdom, a tradition that others
might "attack and revise." 83 If the present tradition of American
84
legal history is to be a primarily economic interpretation,
75

1d 531-36.
See, e.g., L. FULLER, supranote 71.
77R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 156 (rev. ed. 1953).
78
pickering, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REV. 755,760 n.10 (1971).
79
76

On the historical school generally, see R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL

HISTORY (1923).
80
8 1FRIEDMAN 352.

See, e.g., id 179-80 (the intellectual and social basis of common law marriage);
98-99 (the attempts following the Revolution to replace "lawyers' law" with "natural
justice, whatever that might mean"); 79 (the influence on codification of the Puritans' use

of the Bible as authority); 94-95 (the impact of the thought of French jurists on the
codification movement); 543-44 (the lack of influence of philosophy or social science on
late nineteenth-century
legal literature).
2
8 R. POUND, supra note 79. Pound called these theories of interpretation the

"ethical," "political," "ethnological and biological" and "engineering theories." Another
theory of Pound's based on biography was the "great lawyer" theory. Id
88 4FRIEDMAN 9.

Professor Friedman's forbear, Willard Hurst, was also criticized for his overly

economic analysis fifteen years ago. Surrency, Book Review, 1 Am.J. LEGAL HIsT. 195,

196 (1956).
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perhaps a fruitful attack and revision might center around some
resurrected jurisprudential, perhaps natural law, perspective.
A more basic problem with Professor Friedman's analysis
which perhaps results from his social science orientation is his
central proposition that law is a "mirror of society." Aside from
the difficulty that this kind of a statement is so general and so
elusive as to be neither greatly meaningful nor provable, the
perspective that it fosters tends to emphasize the instrumental
and non-normative aspects of law almost to the exclusion of all
others. Thus, while Professor Friedman notes the moral
component of the criminal law in colonial America, his analysis
of it appears to be ultimately economic." Further, while
apparently accepting, at least partially, the proposition that laws
may be passed simply for their symbolic value in reinforcing
dominant norms, and not for instrumental purposes,8 6 he does
not develop this theme to a satisfactory extent, or reconcile it
with the book's predominantly non-normative approach.
Turning away from problems of perspectives on legal
historiography, and focusing on Professor Friedman's treatment
of more substantive matters, the topics in the development of law
before the last few decades of the nineteenth century are treated,
in general, quite satisfactorily and straightforwardly. This is true
for both the scope of issues discussed and Professor Friedman's
evaluation of the substantive trends that he observes. To this
reviewer at least, it does not appear that Professor Friedman has
left any major stone unturned, 87 and there is thus no need to
discuss these substantive topics beyond the short description of
them provided at the beginning of this Review, or the topics
mentioned as illustrations of the major themes in the book.
Particular problems plague Friedman's analysis of the more
recent past, however. Probably the most disturbing to one who
received his legal training pursuant to the now widely accepted
case method is Professor Friedman's criticism of its founder,
Harvard's Dean Langdell. Consistent with his positivistic
historiographical view, Professor Friedman appears to be more
85

FRIEDMAN 64-65.
Professor Friedman alludes to this point as having been made by another scholar in
connection with the passage of liquor laws, and very briefly draws parallels to the laws
governing divorces and lotteries. Id 511.
87It should be noted, however, that Professor Friedman has "deliberately kept to a
minimum" references to constitutional law, and has emphasized the history of state law,
since the former has been explored quite adequately by other scholars. Id 10.
One minor omission is a decent discussion of the trial of John Peter Zenger, a
colonial printer prosecuted for publishing statements critical of the crown's government
in New York. Zenger's acquittal by a colonial jury, in the face of what appeared to be a
clear violation of the criminal libel statute in question, has been seen as an early
development in the continuing American struggle for freedom of the press. See generallyA
BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE OFJOHN PETER ZENGER (S. Katz ed. 1963).
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comfortable with the thinking of the legal realists 88 of the
twenties and thirties such as Karl Llewellyn 89 and Jerome
Frank,9 ° than with the "theological" 9' theories of late nineteenthcentury figures like Langdell, who viewed law as a science with
independent principles of its own. According to Langdell, the
scientific study of primary legal sources such as judicial opinions
would lead the student to derive "the few, ever-present, and
ever-evolving and fructifying principles, which constituted the
genius of the common law."9 Langdell believed that training in
this type of analysis would produce the most capable lawyers.
Professor Friedman takes a dim view of this shamelessly
noninstrumental conception of law, and concludes that:
If law is at all the product of society, then Langdell's
science of law was a geology without rocks, an
astronomy without stars. Lawyers and judges raised on
the method, if they took their training at all seriously,
came to speak of law mainly in terms of a dry, arid
logic, divorced from society and life.93
Searching for a way to explain the widespread acceptance of
Langdell's teaching method and ideas, and the almost feverish
establishment of the Socratic method, Professor Friedman
indulges in a bit of retrospective psychoanalysis. He states that
Langdell's method won acceptance because it exalted the
prestige of law and legal learning in a period when lawyers
needed to justify their monopoly of practice. 94 Perhaps this is one
of those areas where grandiose social science analysis proves too
much.95 It is more likely that Langdell's method won widespread
acceptance simply because it worked, and produced more
capable lawyers than older methods which relied on outmoded
ideas of rote learning.
Professor Friedman acknowledges that "[i] t would be more
than presumptuous to deal with 20th-century law in a few short
88

Also, as suggested earlier, Professor Friedman's conception of law as a mirror of
society shares a weakness of the theories of the legal realists, "a failure to distinguish
different levels and points of criticism, and a core ambiguity about the role of values in
social and legal thought." See generally Note, Legal Theory andLegal Education,79 YALE LJ.
1153, 1159 (1970).
89See, e.g., K. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
9°See,e.g.,J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949).
91
Holmes called Langdell "the greatest living legal theologian." FRIEDMAN 544.
92jad 531.
931d 535.
94Id 536.
95
Professor Friedman's analysis occasionally demonstrates the truth of an observation
which Roscoe Pound made almost forty years ago, that in American legal history there is
such a thing as "too much perspective." Pound, New Possibilities of Old Materials of
American LegalHistory, 40 W. VA. L.Q. 205, 206 (1934).
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pages," 96 and then proceeds to do so. Granted, the aims of his
epilogue are very limited: "[to] sketch, very broadly, some of
the lines along which law in the 20th century seems to have
evolved and to be evolving, and [to] briefly discuss to what
extent this American law is a continuation of what has gone
'9 7
before, or a fulfillment, or a sharp and precipitous break.
Unfortunately his epilogue probably raises more questions than
it answers.
Professor Friedman certainly notes the main twentiethcentury legal developments: prohibition, the New Deal, the civil
rights revolution, and the judicial activism of the Warren Court.
Yet, as he makes clear "The strands that have gone to make the
1970's what they are, are far too complex for general
treatment."9 8 Unwilling to let well enough alone, however,
Professor Friedman makes an attempt at just such a generalization for twentieth-century law:
It seems, in the long glance of history (which may be
inaccurate too), that here was the unpeeling of one
more layer of the onion of rationalism, one further
consequence of the sunburst of modern secular
thought. In our parochial legal terms, we can describe
it as part of the process of making one legal culture out
of the vertical pluralism of bygone times. Nobody, of
whatever color or condition, seemed willing to accept a
lower or despicable status, in law or in fact; to accept
the detrimental definitions that an outside majority (or
minority) had fastened on its head. 99
In other words, everybody wanted a piece of the action. True, no
doubt, but hardly helpful in reaching a deeper understanding of
the history of American law.
More fruitful in that regard, perhaps, would have been a
deeper analysis of the mid-twentieth-century phenomenon that
"[the Supreme Court, particularly when Earl Warren was
ChiefJustice... took a stand far in advance of public opinion,
in protecting unpopular minorities and furthering their interests." ' In light of the narrative in the rest of the book this
activity on the part of the Supreme Court was unique, and was
certainly something more than the law acting as a "mirror of
society." Professor Friedman, however, preferring to hide under
the obfuscating rubric of rationalism, refuses really to analyze it.
6
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9 Id
'°Id 578.
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Perhaps it is in explaining the Warren Court's rather
sudden bounding ahead of legal tradition and public opinion in a
multitude of arenas that more focus on legal philosophy, and less
on economic and social science concepts, would be helpful.
Though this too is oversimplified, perhaps it would have been
useful for Professor Friedman to have paused in his epilogue and
observed that through his narrative we could watch first a
natural law philosophy create the country's Constitution and
encourage the acceptance of the common law. A few years later
we could observe an instrumental conception of law emerge, as
judges became more positivistic and attempted to foster
economic development in the years before the Civil War.
Subsequently we could see a reaction to this philosophy, as a
stultifying conservatism set in on the bench following a national
cataclysm, and then a rebirth of the instrumental conception with
the legal realists in the twenties. Finally, the circle complete, we
might note natural law's return with Warren's query, "Is it fair?"
Perhaps such a cyclical view of legal history is fanciful,'' but
there appears to be a basis for it in0the
2 development of the law as
described by Professor Friedman.
Two more puzzling peccadilloes perpetrated by Professor
Friedman in his treatment of twentieth-century trends are his
rather savage comments on the drafters of restatements and on
his brother academics. With regard to the former group,
apparently shocked by what he perceives as their unwillingness
to come to grips with the social or economic consequences of the
rules they proposed, he dismisses their work as follows: "They
took fields of living law, scalded their flesh, drained off their
blood, and reduced them to bones."' 1 3 Despite the eloquence of
this denunciation, Professor Friedman fails to explain why such
potent vitriol is warranted in attacking the restaters, or why in a
legal world that he perceives to be governed by the utilitarian,
this supposedly fruitless activity, begun more than forty years
ago, still proceeds today.
In explaining why the movement for ecological reform
' 0 10ne particularly obvious shortcoming of this simplified cyclical analysis is that
natural law appears at almost every stage in the arguments of some lawyers or jurists who
attempt to support their position in the way that politicians link themselves with such
elusive values as patriotism and motherhood. Thus during the era which I have said was
characterized by a stultifying conservatism, - courts were overturning some social
legislation on the theory that it was "'counter to the broad general basis of Anglo-Saxon
civilization'." Id 316. See generally Note, supra note 88.
02
1 An accessible introduction to cyclical historical theory, which might prove useful
to legal historians, is provided by A. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (D.C. Somervell
abr. 01957).
3
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caught on in the ivory towers in the late sixties Professor
Friedman states:
Academics and the leisured class had their own selfinterest, as consumers, at stake; they also needed and
wanted some way to spend their surplus time and
money. Many expended energy collecting stamps,
writing histories of China, going to antique shops,
getting drunk, and otherwise, but a certain number hit
on the environmental crisis, which was 104
real enough,
and for which the time was somehow ripe.
Though such condescension may be nothing more than harmless
twitting of one's colleagues, it is clearly out of place in a book
that purports to dwell on a high plane.
With these criticisms of the book's historiographical perspective and its substantive treatment of certain subjects
completed, it is appropriate to predict of what use the book will
be, and to whom. A History of A merican Law will be of relatively
limited use to the experienced scholar. Its analysis is almost
entirely a result of the examination of secondary sources, and at
times the narrative is merely a recapitulation of what has gone
before.10 5 Still, the bibliography is superb, gathers virtually all
the important writing in American legal history, and features a
helpful short essay discussing the major works. Thus the book
may be added to the scholar's shelf as a handy reference and
refresher. Where the book may become invaluable, however, is
as a supplement or text in the hands of the beginning student of
legal history, whether he is a graduate student in American
history, or an undergraduate in law. For the former, A History of
American Law will relate legal developments to what is already
known about the student's discipline. For the latter the book will
provide a conception of the breadth of American law which has
heretofore been unavailable in a single volume. Finally, in
Professor Friedman's attempt to make the book useful to
laymen, an enterprise in which he largely succeeds, 10 7 he has
l0 41d 586.
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This is frankly acknowledged by the author in his discussions of slavery in the
colonial period, id 75; the reception of English statutes, id 95; the history of divorce
laws, id 181, and mortgage law, id 217; the development of the law of negligence, id
262, and wrongful death, id 415; and Dean Langdell's reforms at Harvard Law School,
id 530. Because so much of A History ofAmerican Law is rather uncritically accepted from
secondary sources, it is clear that the book does not rise to the level of a definitive account
of the type that is now beginning to appear with the volumes of the Holmes Devise
history of the Supreme Court. See Horwitz, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1076, 1077
(1972); Pollak, Book Review, 82 YALELJ. 856,864 (1973).
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furnished a perfect guide for the first-year law student faced with
exams in torts, contracts, property or criminal law, who
desperately needs something to tell him what the purpose of
these fields of law is, and has been. Turning to Professor
Friedman's book, such a reader will find the answers he seeks
(albeit partial ones) set forth in clear, straightforward language.
It is appropriate that a review of A History of American Law
close with a paean to its author's purely literary skill. While his
analysis may be problematic in parts, he has succeeded
admirably in the enterprise for which I still admire my civil
procedure professor-making exciting the struggles and personalities that contributed to the development of law. In short,
Professor Friedman has contributed to the romance of American
legal history. Perhaps his skill as a writer and analyst is best put
in Professor Friedman's own words, which he used to describe
the Commentaries of Chancellor Kent:
The style is at all points clear, the exposition transparent. Occasionally [he] even turns a decent phrase or
two. He had a sure and impressive grasp of the whole
fabric of American law. His jurisprudential thought
was not original or profound; but his attitude toward
the living law was pragmatic, hard-boiled and often
shrewd.' °
In reviewing a book on legal history that has placed so much
stock in the importance of social science, perhaps it is justifiable
to borrow from psychology, and to accuse its author of a bit of
projection.
helpful are the myriad uses of the phrase "common law," and the underlying legal
attractiveness of limited liability in the corporate form which led to its phenomenal
development.
108
FRIEDMAN 291.

